Appendix A List of Submitters - First Round Written Submissions

Wendy Adams

Norm Adolphson

Paul Ainscough

Mayor, Town of Drumheller

Herbert Albrecht

Marilyn Assheton-Smith

President, Edmonton-Strathcona NDP Constituency Association

Wayne Ayling

Mayor, City of Grande Prairie

A.M. Balfour

Ken Balko

President, Edmonton-Beverly-Clareview PC Constituency Association

R.T. Ballantyne

Carlos Barth

Robert, Jaqueline and Rob Beagle

Evan Berger

Reeve, MD of Williow Creek

E.G. Bowden

Robert B. Breakell

A.J. Brinker

Dave Broda

MLA, Redwater

Duncan Brooks

President, Edmonton-Gold Bar Liberal Association

Eric F. Bryant

Herb Buchanan

Richard Buchanan

Chairman, Lac Cardinal Regional Economic Development Board

Robert Bouchard

Reeve, County of St. Paul No. 19

Beverley Bushell

Pat Burns

Daniel P. Carroll

President, Edmonton-Riverview Liberal Constituency Associtation

Andrew R. Cameron

Lawrence Cherneski

David Chamberlain

R.N. Christie

Jeanette Chernow

President, Calgary-Egmont PC Association

James D. Clark

Ed Chubocha

Reeve, County of Leduc

Gale Conarroe

Pat Cochrane

Chair, Calgary Board of Education

James Coswan

Mayor, Village of Waskatenau

Sheila Cooper

Betty Kruse

Chair, Peace Regional Health Authority

E.N. Crowther

Paulo Da Costa

Kathy Czar

Martin M. Driessen Q.C.

R. Wayne Davey

Reeve, Vulcan County

Helmut Eisert

Milton Elliot

Reeve, Clearwater County

Mark Fecho

Jacqueline Fetherston

President, Calgary-Bow PC Constituency Association

Peter Fitzgerald-Moore

Anne Flynn

Municipal Officer, Village of New Norway

Tom Flynn

President, Redwater PC Constituency Association

Heather Forsyth

MLA, Calgary-Fish Creek

Mike Franchuk

Reeve, County of Smoky Lake No. 13

Cecil Gammon

Robert N. Gibbard

Dr. Roger Gibbins

President and CEO, Canada West Foundation

Robert Giles

Jean Graham

Zoria E. Grieve

Doug Grisack

John Gullett

Bart Guyon

Reeve, MD of Brazeau No. 77

Mark Hambridge

William Hamilton

Kristy A. Harcourt

Randy Harris

Terry Helgeson

Sid A. Hinton

Reeve, Counrty of Minburn

John Hohm

Kenneth Hoppins

Reeve, Kneehill County

Bernie Hornby

Mayor, Town of Fox Creek

Joanne Horton

Village of Marwayne

Robert Howard

Dr. John T. Huang

Vice President of Policy, Calgary-Varsity PC Constituency Association

Asgeir Ingibergsson

John Isbister

Colin Jackson

Harold James

Executive Director

Doreen T. Jeary-Fischer

Felix Jesualexander

David Johnson

Penny Kary

Municipal Administrator

Dan Kelly

Vice President Prairie Region, Canadian Federation of Independent Business

Mark Kelly

Peter and Evangeline Keough

Bill and Mary-Lou King

Mel Knight

MLA, Grande Prairie-Smoky

Ross Koelmans

Scott Koratch

City of Lloydminster

Jeff Kovitz Q.C.

Kathryn Kozak Wiebe

Mayor, Town of Bonnyville

Jason Krips

President, Spruce Grove-Sturgeon-St. Albert PC Constituency Association

David Kucherawy

Mayor, Town of Vegreville

Manny Langman

Donna E. LaPretre

Executive Director, Poverty In Action Society

Douglas Lee

Lori Leibel

Village of Innisfree

Alvin J. Levitt

Gerald Lovejoy

Robert MacDonald

Director, Leduc PC Constituency Association

Anne Mair

Edmonton-Glengarry PC Constituency Association

Gary Malthouse

Alan Martens

County Administrator, County of Newell No. 4

Bernhard Martens

David Marynowich

County Manager, County of Minburn - East Portion

Marlene Maxwell

Reeve, MD Clearhills No. 21

Patrik McCall

Don McCallum

Rod E. McConnell

Ray McFetridge

Bruce McGregor

Margaret McKay

Lois McLeod

President, Little-Bow PC Constituency Association

Diana McQueen

Chair, Brazeau Seniors Foundation

Greg Melchin

MLA, Calgary-North West

John Middleton-Hope

Dean Milner

Michael Minchin

Director of Corporate Services, Town of Drumheller

Andre Morin

D.W. Morley

Brad Musat

President, Lac La Biche Chamber of Commerce

Nina Neville

Jeff Newland

Town Councillor, Town of Wainwright

Allan C. Oliver

K.J. Olsen

Ralph and Noreen Olson

Elsie Osbak

Ed Parent

Robert Pelletier

Mayor, Town of Legal

Harry Pelton

David R. Pfau B.A. LL.B.

Corinne Pohlmann

Director, Provincial Affairs, Alberta/NWT, Canadian Federation of Independent Business

Carol Potter

John Reid

Chair, Provincial Advocacy, Calgary Professional Arts Alliance

June Roe

George Rogers

Mayor, City of Leduc

W.H. Rogerson

Anne Rothwell

Bernice Sambor

Lamont-Two Hills Business Development Corporation

Bonnie Sansregret

President, Consort and District Chamber of Commerce

Al Seatter

President, Calgary-North West PC Constituency Association

Brent Shewchuck

Doug Schierman, P.Eng.

Peter Sidey

Bill Smith

Mayor, City of Edmonton

Dr. T.J. (Tom) Snell

Olds-Didsbury-Three Hills PC Constituency Association

D.L. (Lou) Soppit

Mayor, Town of Rocky Mountain House

John Stevens

Mayor, Picture Butte

Michael Stiles

David and Gail Stolee

Evelyn Straty

Secretary-Treasurer, Village of Myrnam

Margaret Tardif

Mayor, Town of Falher

Frank C. Totino

Hans and Lena Visser

Ed Waelpoel

Phillip H. Walker

Sid Wallace

George and Mabel Ward

Dr. D.C. Warwick

Robert H. Watt

Town of Vermilion

Erik Weigeldt

David Wiens

Connie Wilkinson

Village of Paradise Valley

Sharon Williams

Village of Kitscoty

Art Williamson

R.E. Wolf

Valerie J. Wray

Shannon Wyatt

President, Sherwood Park PC Constituency Association

Joseph Yanchula

Hal Zoeller

Henry Zolkewski

Reeve, Couty of Thorhild No. 7

Appendix B ALBERTA ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES COMMISSION MINORITY POSITION by Bauni Mackay

Increasing the number of Calgary electoral divisions to 23 to partially accommodate that city's 15.8% growth and retaining 42 in the rest of the province leaves Edmonton with 18 electoral divisions, one fewer than it currently has. I disagree with the recommendation to remove a division from Edmonton for several reasons. POPULATION GROWTH: Although Edmonton did not have the growth of Calgary prior to the 2001 Census, it did have a growth rate of 8.7%, enough to retain 19 electoral divisions. Based on the 2001 Census figures, the average population of the current Edmonton electoral divisions is 35,058, just 2.4% below the provincial average of 35,951. Edmonton has grown dramatically since the 2001 Census was completed. According to Economic Development Edmonton, in 2001 the population of Edmonton grew by 4.5%, exceeding the Conference Board of Canada's forecast that it would be the fastest growing city in Canada with a growth rate of 4.1%. The Conference Board of Canada forecasts Edmonton's growth at 2.4% for 2002 and 4.5% for 2003. According to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, in the first six months of 2002, single family housing starts in Edmonton increased by 50% compared to the same period last year. In May of 2002 there was a 95% jump in single and multiple housing starts compared to May, 2001, and in June the increase over last year's figures was 91%. In other words, Edmonton's rapid growth has been occurring since the 2001 Census and is forecast to continue. However, the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act stipulates that the next Commission is to be appointed no sooner than 8 years after the appointment of this Commission. Therefore, in the next eight years, Edmonton's population will be disproportionately larger than the figures in the Commission's report indicate, thus further diluting Edmontonians' votes in the next two elections and further diminishing Edmonton's voice in the Legislative Assembly. REPRESENTATION BY POPULATION: The concept of representation by population (one person, one vote) is fundamental to a democratic society. Voter parity should be the first consideration in determining electoral boundaries. However, the proposal that Calgary gain two seats, Edmonton lose one seat and the rest of the province lose only one seat means that the residents of Edmonton will have their right to democratic representation compromised. The challenge is to find ways to get as close as possible to voter parity without violating anyone's right to effective representation. Inevitably, this requires additional human and financial resources to provide the physical means to ensure effective representation for all Albertans, including more rural constituency offices and staff, increased air travel, more assistance with ground travel, and high quality communications technology. The capacity to do this rests in the will of the Legislative Assembly, not in taking a division from Edmonton. EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION: The definition of effective representation is vague. It would seem that the ease with which the MLA and constituents are able to have access to each other is the measurement of effective representation. However, ensuring adequate access and addressing access issues is the responsibility of Member Services, not of the Electoral Boundaries Commission. At one time access required face to face contact. Distance, area, and population density were critical factors in determining the effectiveness of representation. However, in the 21st century, access means communicating efficiently and expediently. The excellent communications technology available across Alberta, including the Supernet, makes distance, area, and population density insignificant barriers to accessibility. Where one lives or works in this province no longer determines one's ability to communicate anywhere in the world. Effectiveness of representation is no longer a function of location. Distance from the legislature is a differentiating factor, but Alberta is blessed with a network of roads and air strips that is second to none. If there is a weak link in this network, it is the lack of adequate roadways in Edmonton and Calgary. Although linear distance, geographic area, and low population density are viewed as potential barriers to effective representation and are therefore measured and compared, cultural distance as defined by linguistic, ethnic, religious, cultural and racial diversity is not. Neither is the social distance that is created by the fact that large cities are magnets for the physically, mentally, emotionally, or spiritually unwell. Similarly, vertical distance and high population density can be daunting because any kind of access to residents of apartment blocks and high rises is often impossible. The anonymity and social isolation of city dwellers provides another invisible distance. These distances, unlike linear distance, cannot be bridged by technology because there must be social learning, which can come only from interpersonal contact. Although these distances make effective representation in some Edmonton constituencies extremely difficult, they were not taken into consideration in the distribution of electoral divisions. INCREASING URBANIZATION: Like the rest of the world, Alberta has become increasingly urbanized. This phenomenon places great stress on those rural areas that are coping with the economic and social losses accompanying their de-population just as it does on the large urban centres as they struggle to develop the infrastructure to support their burgeoning populations. During the hearings in rural Alberta, the Commission heard a lot about the loss of rural power in most economic, social and political arenas in the province. The remedy proposed by most presenters at these hearings is to maintain or even increase the number of rural electoral divisions. Some presenters suggested giving urban electoral divisions a +25% variance from the provincial average and rural electoral divisions a -25% variance to compensate for the imbalance in population. While there is no question that the changing face of the province presents a major concern that must be dealt with, the urban/rural distinction serves no useful purpose in grappling with the economic, political and social challenges facing Albertans. The solution lies in public policy and not in removing a division from Edmonton. Diluting Edmonton's voice in the Legislative Assembly is not the solution to maintaining a strong rural population. In fact there is a growing body of evidence to show how regressive and counter productive such a move is. For example, in A State of Minds: Toward a Human Capital Future for Canadians, Tom Courchene states that cities are where the policies of the federal and provincial governments most visibly come into play - policies related to health care, education, immigration, and trade and investment. He says that more than ever, these governments must look through an urban lens to see how well their policies are working. Anne Golden, the president and Chief Executive Officer of the Conference Board of Canada told the Toronto City Summit on June 26, 2002 that "globalization and the knowledge and information revolution have greatly enhanced the position and importance of cities...."In the July 24, 2002 edition of The Edmonton Journal, Golden also says," We need to take a closer look at the plight of Canadian cities. Canadian cities are charged not only with the basic business of city-building - roads, transit and other infrastructure required by modern economies - but also must shoulder a large portion of the responsibility for various social programs... A consensus about the need for change is developing, and it is characterized by a deepening understanding of the pivotal role of cities in the dynamics of innovation." In his presentation to the Electoral Boundaries Commission, Dr. Roger Gibbins, President and CEO of Canada West Foundation reiterated this point of view. He talked about the need to recognize the role of cities in the global economy, pointing out that: cities drive the new, knowledge-based economy which is central to the well-being of this province, cities attract immigration, which is vitally important to provide the human capital necessary to compete in the global economy, cities are where national and international corporations choose to locate based on the quality of life offered in those cities. Dr. Gibbins stated that "all Albertans stand to gain from an urban strategy that enhances the competitive position of the province's major cities in the new global economy." He went on to say, "I would argue, therefore, that the Electoral Boundaries Commission should recognize both the urban growth to date and the urban growth to come … It should recommend that urban voters bring their demographic weight to bear in the Legislative Assembly, thereby ensuring that the Assembly reflects and responds to the province's new urban agenda… I would recommend that the Electoral Boundaries Commission should embrace rather than resist Alberta's new urban reality, and thereby play a role in enhancing the province's competitive position… The Electoral Boundaries Commission should embrace the new urban realities, enhance urban representation in the Legislative Assembly, and then, but only then, empower representatives from low-density constituencies through reducing the numerical size of their constituencies." Dr. Gibbins was not talking only about Calgary. To ignore the role of Edmonton in the changing economy by removing an electoral division and diminishing that city's voice in the Legislative Assembly is to lack the vision and flexibility demanded by the realities of the 21st Century. WHAT THE NUMBERS DO NOT SAY: The recommendations of the Electoral Boundaries Commission are based on a precise interpretation of the legislation and pertinent court decisions, with little visionary latitude. Exchanging three electoral divisions north of Red Deer for three electoral divisions in and around Calgary recognizes neither the geographic size nor the economic explosion of the top two-thirds of the province. Similarly, focusing on the numbers disregards the fact that Edmonton is the economic and social hub of the northern two-thirds of the province, extending from Red Deer to the Northwest Territories border and beyond. Edmonton is the capital city, the seat of government, the gateway to the North, and the magnet site for health care, education , employment, recreation, and commerce for the major part of the province. Residents from Red Deer north to the Territories and beyond depend on Edmonton for all of these services, some within a 100 km. radius on a daily basis, others intermittently as the need arises. Government decisions affecting the central and northern part of Alberta have an impact on Edmonton, and Edmonton's voice in the Legislature must be strong enough to influence these decisions. Edmonton, with the most diversified business base in the province, including knowledge- based industries, has one of the fastest growing economies in the country. This benefits the whole province. Growth in the metropolitan area surrounding Edmonton is largely the result of Edmonton's rapid economic development. Similarly, the foundation of much of the economic activity and consequent population growth in the northern part of the province is generated, supported and facilitated in Edmonton. Removing an electoral division from Edmonton fails to acknowledge the major role Edmonton plays in the economic success and social growth of this province. Not one presenter at the Commission hearings in Edmonton suggested that Edmonton should lose a division. Even in the rest of the province, there were very few presenters who singled out Edmonton to lose a division. However, what we did hear many times in rural Alberta is that the electoral boundaries process should be about people and not about numbers. The people of Edmonton should not be penalized because their city did not grow as fast as Calgary prior to the 2001 Census. They should not be the victims of timing, circumstance, or rigid adherence to a numerical doctrine. What the numbers do not say expresses the truth far more accurately and fairly than what they do say. Therefore, notwithstanding the arguments put forth in the interim report of the Alberta Electoral Boundaries Commission, Edmonton should retain 19 electoral divisions. Dated at Edmonton, Alberta, this 9th day of September, 2002. Bauni Mackay, Member

Appendix C ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES COMMISSION ACT Chapter E-3

HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, enacts as follows: Definition 1 In this Act, "Commission" means an Electoral Boundaries Commission appointed pursuant to section 2. 1990 cE-4.01 s1 Part 1 Electoral Boundaries Commissions Electoral Boundaries Commission 2(1) From time to time as required by this Act, an Electoral Boundaries Commission is to be appointed consisting of   (a) a chair appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council,     (i)  who must be one of the following:     (ii)  the Ethics Commissioner;     (iii)  the Auditor General;     (iv)  the president of a post-secondary educational     (v)  institution in Alberta;     (vi)  a judge or retired judge of any court in Alberta;     (vii)  a person whose stature and qualifications are, in the opinion of the            Lieutenant Governor in Council, similar to those of the persons referred to in subclauses (i) to (iv),   (b) 2 persons, who are not members of the Legislative Assembly, appointed by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly on the nomination of the Leader of Her Majesty's loyal opposition in consultation with the leaders of the other opposition parties represented in the Legislative Assembly, and   (c) 2 persons, who are not members of the Legislative Assembly, appointed by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly on the nomination of the President of the Executive Council. (2) The Chief Electoral Officer is to provide advice, information and assistance to the Commission. (3) With respect to the persons appointed under subsection (1)(b), one must be resident in a city and the other resident outside a city at the time of their appointment. (4) With respect to the persons appointed under subsection (1)(c), one must be resident in a city and the other resident outside a city at the time of their appointment. (5) Persons appointed under subsection (1) must be Canadian citizens, residents of Alberta and at least 18 years of age. 1990 cE-4.01 s2;1995 c10 s2 Function 3 The function of a Commission is to review the existing electoral boundaries established under the Electoral divisions Act and to make proposals to the Legislative Assembly as to the area, boundaries and names of the electoral divisions of Alberta in accordance with the rules set out in Part 2. 1990 cE-4.01 s3;1995 c10 s3 Remuneration 4(1) The members of a Commission may be paid the remuneration prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council for their services on the Commission. (2) The members of a Commission may be paid their reasonable travelling and living expenses while away from their ordinary place of residence in the course of their duties as members at the rates the Lieutenant Governor in Council prescribes. 1990 cE-4.01 s4 Time of Appointment 5(1) A Commission is to be appointed on or before June 30, 2002. (2) Subsequent Commissions are to be appointed during the first session of the Legislature following every 2nd general election after the appointment of the last Commission. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), if less than 8 years has elapsed since the appointment of the last Commission, the Commission is to be appointed   (a) no sooner than 8 years, and   (b) no later than 10 years after the appointment of the last Commission. RSA 2000 cE-3 s5;2001 c23 s3 Report to Speaker 6(1) The Commission shall, after considering any representations to it and within 7 months of the date on which the Commission is appointed, submit to the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly a report that shall set out the area, boundaries and names of the proposed electoral divisions and reasons for the proposed boundaries of the proposed electoral divisions (2) On receipt of the report, the Speaker shall make the report public and publish the Commission's proposals in The Alberta Gazette as soon as possible. (3) If the office of Speaker is vacant, the report shall be submitted to the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, who shall comply with subsection (2). 1990 cE-4.01 s6;1995 c10 s5 Public Hearings 7(1) The Commission must hold public hearings both   (a) before its report is submitted to the Speaker, and   (b) after its report has been made public, at the places and times it considers appropriate to enable representations to be made by any person as to the area and boundaries of any proposed electoral division. (2) The Commission shall give reasonable public notice of the time, place and purpose of any public hearings held by it. 1990 cE-4.01 s7;1993 c2 s8 Amendment of Report 8(1) The Commission may, after considering any further representations made to it and within 5 months of the date it submitted its report, submit to the Speaker a final report. (2) On receipt of the report, the Speaker shall make it public and publish it in The Alberta Gazette. (3) If the office of Speaker is vacant, the report shall be submitted to the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, who shall comply with subsection (2). 1990 cE-4.01 s8;1995 c10 s6 Commission Report 9 If there is more than one report submitted under section 6 or 8, the report of a majority of the members of the Commission is the report of the Commission, but if there is no majority, the report of the chair is the report of the Commission. 1995 c10 s7 Report to Assembly 10 After the Commission has complied with sections 6 to 8, the final report of the Commission shall,   (a) if the Legislative Assembly is sitting when the report is submitted, be laid before the Assembly immediately, or   (b) if the Legislative Assembly is not then sitting, be laid before the Assembly within 7 days after the beginning of the next sitting. 1990 cE-4.01 s9;1995 c10 s8 New Electoral Divisions 11(1) If the Assembly, by resolution, approves or approves with alterations the proposals of the Commission, the Government shall, at the same session, introduce a Bill to establish new electoral divisions for Alberta in accordance with the resolution. (2) The Bill shall be stated to come into force on Proclamation and, if enacted, shall be proclaimed in force before the holding of the next general election. 1990 cE-4.01 s10 Part 2 Redistribution Rules Population 12(1) In this Part, "population" means, subject to subsection (2), the population of Alberta as provided in the most recent decennial census of population referred to in section 19(3) of the Statistics Act (Canada), from which the population of all proposed electoral divisions is available, plus the population on Indian reserves that were not included in the census, as provided by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada). (2) If, in the opinion of the Commission, there is some other province-wide census that is more recent than the decennial census of population referred to in section 19(3) of the Statistics Act (Canada), from which the population of all proposed electoral divisions is available, the population of Alberta for the purposes of this Part is to be determined   (a) by that province-wide census of population, and   (b) with respect to the population on Indian reserves that are not included in the census, by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (Canada). 1990 cE-4.01 s12;1993 c2 s10;1995 c10 s9 Electoral Divisions 13 The Commission is to divide Alberta into 83 proposed electoral divisions. 1990 cE-4.01 s13;1995 c10 s10 Relevant Considerations 14 In determining the area to be included in and in fixing the boundaries of the proposed electoral divisions, the Commission, subject to section 15, may take into consideration any factors it considers appropriate, but shall take into consideration   (i) the requirement for effective representation as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,   (j) scarcity and density of population,   (k) common community interests and community organizations, including those of Indian reserves and Metis settlements,   (l) wherever possible, the existing community boundaries within the cities of Edmonton and Calgary,   (m) wherever possible, the existing municipal boundaries,   (n) the number of municipalities and other local authorities,   (o) geographical features, including existing road systems, and   (p) the desirability of understandable and clear boundaries. 1990 cE-4.01 s16;1993 c2 s12;1995 c10 s12 Population of Electoral Divisions 15(1) The population of a proposed electoral division must not be more than 25% above nor more than 25% below the average population of all the proposed electoral divisions. (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), in the case of no more than 4 of the proposed electoral divisions, if the Commission is of the opinion that at least 3 of the following criteria exist in a proposed electoral division, the proposed electoral division may have a population that is as much as 50% below the average population of all the proposed electoral divisions:   (c) the area of the proposed electoral division exceeds 20,000 square kilometres or the total surveyed area of the proposed electoral division exceeds 15,000 square kilometres;   (d) the distance from the Legislature Building in Edmonton to the nearest boundary of the proposed electoral division by the most direct highway route is more than 150 kilometres;   (e) there is no town in the proposed electoral division that has a population exceeding 4,000 people;   (f) the area of the proposed electoral division contains an Indian reserve or a Metis settlement;   (g) the proposed electoral division has a portion of its boundary coterminous with a boundary of the Province of Alberta. (3) For the purpose of subsection (2)(c), The Municipality of Crowsnest Pass is not a town. 1990 cE-4.01 s17;1993 c2 s13

Appendix D EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE 2002 YUKON ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES COMMISSION

Reprinted with permission of Elections Yukon

part ii: CONSIDERATIONS

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) states: Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.   Legal Precedent The Commission reviewed the relevant cases. The first Canadian court case to consider the constitutionality of electoral boundaries was Dixon v. Attorney General of British Columbia[i], decided by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 1989. Dixon concluded that the “right to vote” in section 3 of the Charter gives rise to constitutional limits on the unequal distribution of population between electoral districts. While the Court decided that section 3 of the Charter did not require absolute equality of voting power[ii] it did find that “relative equality of voting power is fundamental to the right to vote.”[iii]   The Dixon case also concluded that deviations from “absolute parity” should be permitted, but only those “which can be justified on the ground that they contribute to better government of the populous as a whole, giving due weight to regional issues within the populous and geographic factors within the territory governed.”[iv]   While Dixon approved of setting limits on the extent to which the province of British Columbia could deviate from equality of voting power, it stated, “In determining the amount of deviation permissible, deference must be accorded to the legislature.”[v]  The maximum deviation of plus or minus 25 percent recommended by the 1987 British Columbia Electoral Boundaries Commission (which had not yet been acted upon) was noted by the Court to be tolerable “given the vast and sparsely populated regions to be found in British Columbia.”[vi]  However, as the subsequent British Columbia Electoral Boundaries Commission remarked in its Report of December 3, 1998 “…nothing in the Dixon decision precludes an argument that, in appropriate circumstances, a deviation greater than plus or minus 25 percent may be justified.”[vii]  As that Report noted, the only general proposition laid down in Dixon is that deviations from voter parity must be justified.   A percentage deviation occurs when the number of electors in an electoral district is compared with the electoral quotient.[viii] The electoral quotient is the average number of electors per electoral district, commonly obtained by dividing the number of electors by the total number of electoral districts.[ix]   In 1991, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of electoral boundaries in Reference Re: Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.)[x] (the “Saskatchewan Reference”). This case remains the leading Canadian authority on the constitutionality of electoral boundaries. It established that “... the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se, but the right to “effective representation”...”[xi] The majority decision stated: Each citizen is entitled to be represented in Government. Representation comprehends the idea of having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the idea of the right to bring one’s grievances and concerns to the attention of one’s government representative; as noted in Dixon ... elected representatives function in two roles – legislative and what has been termed the “ombudsman role.”   What are the conditions of effective representation? The first is relative parity of voting power. ...   But parity of voting power, though of prime importance, is not the only factor to be taken into account in ensuring effective representation. ...   Notwithstanding the fact that the value of a citizen’s vote should not be unduly diluted, it is a practical fact that effective representation cannot often be achieved without taking into account countervailing factors.   First, absolute parity is impossible... Secondly, such relative parity as may be possible of achievement may prove undesirable because it has the effect of detracting from the primary goal of effective representation. Factors like geography, community history, community interests and minority representation may need to be taken into account …   It emerges therefore that deviations from absolute voter parity may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or the provision of more effective representation. Beyond this, dilution of one citizen’s vote as compared with another’s should not be countenanced.  I adhere to the proposition in Dixon … that “only those deviations should be admitted which can be justified on the ground that they contribute to better government of the populace as a whole, giving due weight to regional issues within the populace and geographic factors within the territory governed.”[xii]   The pre-eminence given by the Supreme Court of Canada to effective representation over voter parity is also evident from the following passages. First, where the majority said that the goal of enshrining the right to vote in our written constitution: … was to recognize the right affirmed in this country since the time of our first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, to effective representation in a system which gives due weight to voter parity but admits other considerations where necessary.[xiii]   And later, where the majority stated: In the final analysis, the value and principles animating a free and democratic society are arguably best served by a definition that places effective representation at the heart of the right to vote.[xiv]   In the Saskatchewan Reference the electoral boundaries were created by the Representation Act, 1989 (Saskatchewan).[xv]  That Act was based upon the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Saskatchewan)[xvi], which specified certain permissible maximum deviations from the average number of voters in each constituency.  The permitted deviations were up to 25 percent for the 64 southern Saskatchewan ridings and as high as 50 percent for the two northern ridings.  The Supreme Court of Canada considered both of these maximum deviations constitutionally acceptable.  In particular, no issue was taken either before the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada with the special treatment for the northern ridings, given the sparse population and the difficulty of communication in the area.[xvii]   The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Saskatchewan Reference also spoke of the need for courts to give deference to the legislature in setting permissible deviations: It is important at the outset to remind ourselves of the proper role of courts in determining whether a legislative solution to a complex problem runs afoul of the Charter.  This court has repeatedly affirmed that the courts must be cautious in interfering unduly in decisions that involve the balancing of conflicting policy considerations. … These considerations led me to suggest in Dixon, … that “the courts ought not to interfere with the legislature’s electoral map under s.3 of the Charter unless it appears that reasonable persons applying the appropriate principles … could not have set the electoral boundaries as they exist”.[xviii]   Since the Saskatchewan Reference, the Alberta Court of Appeal has rendered two decisions on electoral boundaries. The first was in 1991, entitled Reference re: Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (the “1991 Alberta Reference”).[xix] The second was in 1994, entitled Reference re: Electoral divisions Statutes Amendment Act, 1993 (the “1994 Alberta Reference”).[xx]   The 1991 Alberta Reference examined a 50 percent deviation limit for up to five percent of the electoral districts in the province which satisfied specific statutory criteria (the details of which were attached as an appendix to the case) focusing on their relative remoteness and sparse population. The Alberta Court of Appeal unanimously accepted that as reasonable and stated: We think we can take notice that Alberta contains sparsely populated areas that are also a long distance both from other populated areas and the legislature itself.[xxi]   The 25 percent deviation permitted in the remaining ridings was found to be acceptable, where necessary.[xxii]  The Court also addressed the matter of deference to the legislature in setting electoral boundaries and said: We must therefore ask ourselves whether a boundary rule or decision is clearly wrong.  In other words, we should not interfere unless a rule or decision is demonstrably unjustified, palpably wrong, or manifestly unreasonable.[xxiii]   In the 1994 Alberta Reference, another panel of the Alberta Court of Appeal examined specific statutory boundaries. The unanimous Court made the following statement emphasizing the need to justify deviations: It is one thing to say that effective representation of a specific community requires an electoral division of a below-average population. That approach invites specific reasons, and specific facts. The Constitution of Canada is sufficiently flexible to permit disparity to serve geographical and demographic reality. It is quite another to say that any electoral division, for no specific reason, may be smaller than average. In the 1991 Reference, we affirmed the first, not the second. We affirm again that there is no permissible variation if there is no justification. And the onus to establish justification lies with those who suggest the variation.[xxiv]   The case of MacKinnon v. Prince Edward Island[xxv] was decided by the Prince Edward Island Supreme Court in 1993, in the interval between the two Alberta reference cases. The Court found the Election Act (P.E.I.) contravened section 3 of the Charter as it legislated unacceptable disparities between the numbers of voters in a district and the provincial average, ranging between 115 percent over the average and 63 percent under the average. Twelve districts were in excess of 40 percent above or below the provincial average.  The Court referred to the Saskatchewan Reference and commented that the case: …does not resolve the question of how far electoral districts can be moved away from strict equality before Charter problems are encountered…[the majority] did not comment specifically on the outer limits of variation that could be constitutionally sustained …[xxvi]   However, the P.E.I. Supreme Court ruled that the deviations in issue before it were “far out of proportion to any legitimate regional concerns” and therefore contrary to the Charter.[xxvii]   In 1998, the case of Charlottetown (City) v. Prince Edward Island came before the Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal.[xxviii] At issue was new legislation creating 27 electoral districts which provided for an electoral population variance of plus or minus 25 percent. The Court of Appeal held that there was “considerable acceptance in Canada” for this level of deviation and that it did not violate section 3 of the Charter.[xxix]  The Court once again emphasized that in determining the amount of variance permissible, “… the legislative process must be allowed to operate without undue judicial interference.”[xxx] An application for leave to appeal Charlottetown to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed without reasons on December 2, 1999.[xxxi]   The most recent case on the constitutionality of electoral districts arose from the creation of the new northern territory of Nunavut on April 1, 1999.  The Northwest Territories, which previously had 24 electoral districts, was to be divided into two parts:  Nunavut in the east (previously with 10 seats) and the remaining Northwest Territories in the west (previously with 14 seats).  An electoral boundaries commission for the remaining Northwest Territories was formed in 1998 in anticipation of this event.  It recommended two additional seats for the voters in Yellowknife, for a total of 16 seats in the remaining Northwest Territories.  The Northwest Territories Legislative Assembly rejected that recommendation and enacted amendments to the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council Act (N.W.T),[xxxii] providing for only 14 seats.  That legislation was challenged in the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories by individual voters claiming a violation of their right to vote under section 3 of the Charter.    The Court gave its judgment on March 5, 1999 in the case of Friends of Democracy v. Northwest Territories (Attorney General) (“Friends of Democracy”).[xxxiii]  The Court held that the amendments violated section 3 of the Charter.  It specifically addressed the over-representation of the non-urban electoral districts and stated: … the right to vote guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter is more than merely the right to be registered as a voter and to cast a ballot on election day.  In times past, there were residents of the Northwest Territories who were denied all right to vote in elections to the House of Commons and in elections to the legislature of the Northwest Territories.  These denials of right have long since been corrected by legislation. Canadians, through Parliament and their provincial and territorial legislatures, have chosen to tolerate a measure of over-representation from thinly populated and relatively remote regions in preference to any such complete denial of legislative representation from those regions.[xxxiv]   However, the over-representation of the more remote regions of the Northwest Territories was not the issue in that case.  Rather the question before the Northwest Territories Supreme Court was “whether the under-representation of voters at Yellowknife, in elections to the Legislative Assembly, is in violation of section 3 of the Charter.”[xxxv] This distinction was further elaborated by the Court as follows: Considering the factors of geography, community history and interests, language differences, difficulties in communication with remote communities and minority representation, not to mention the normal difficulties and expenses of travel between the seat of government at Yellowknife and the various communities outside Yellowknife, I am satisfied that there probably is justification within the ambit of section 3 of the Charter for the present over-representation of the electoral districts whose percentage variations in population are below the average. On the other hand, I am unable to find similar justification for the gross under-representation of those other districts where the variations are markedly (25% or more) above the average. This gross under-representation must constitute a clear violation of section 3 of the Charter in the absence of due justification.[xxxvi]   The challenged legislation in Friends of Democracy did not specify a maximum permissible deviation.  The Court failed to explain why it accepted 25 percent as the threshold, other than to comment on the lack of justification in those instances where 25 percent was exceeded in the urban electoral districts.[xxxvii]   The case also commented on effective representation within the City of Yellowknife: Much was made by counsel for the Respondent and Interveners of the apparently dominant position of Yellowknife within the Northwest Territories, being as it is the seat of government for these Territories and the pre-eminent territorial centre of private commercial and public government business …   There is no real room for doubt as to the much greater access to their elected representatives in the Legislative Assembly by voters at Yellowknife than elsewhere in the Northwest Territories.  Nor is there any question but that access to officials in the government at many levels is generally less of a problem at Yellowknife than elsewhere in these Territories.  The “ombudsman role” of elected representatives for districts at Yellowknife is consequently likely to be more effective and less onerous than for representatives of outlying districts across the Territories.[xxxviii]   The Supreme Court of Canada, in August 1998, had occasion to quote the Saskatchewan Reference in its unanimous decision in Reference re: Secession of Quebec[xxxix] as follows: “[T]he Canadian tradition”, the majority of this Court held in [the Saskatchewan Reference] … is “one of evolutionary democracy moving in uneven steps toward the goal of universal suffrage and more effective representation”.   In November 1999, the Newfoundland Supreme Court commented on the Saskatchewan Reference, in the case of Baker v. Burin School Board[xl] as follows: … the case focuses on the purpose of [section 3 of the Charter] as being designed to ensure “effective representation” while at the same time recognizing that equality of voting may not always be achieved where factors such as geography, community history, community interests, and minority representation require consideration to ensure that legislative assemblies effectively represent their constituents.   This Commission is bound to follow the principles in the Supreme Court of Canada Saskatchewan Reference decision. While the Commission is not bound to follow the decisions it reviewed from other courts, we have been guided where those authorities appeared persuasive. The Commission paid particular attention to the circumstances influencing those decisions which involved northern and sparsely populated electoral districts.   Demographic Information Section 419(a) of the Elections Act mandates that the Commission take into account “the density and rate of growth of the population of any area”. Section 419(d) requires the Commission to consider “available census data and other demographic information”. The Commission was informed that the results of the federal census taken this spring would not be available prior to the deadline for completing our final report. The most recent census information available is the Statistics Canada Census of 1996, which the Commission reviewed for background purposes. We concluded that this information is outdated.   Section 419(e) of the Elections Act requires the Commission to take into account “the number of electors in the electoral districts appearing on the most recent official lists of electors”. Previous Yukon electoral district boundaries commissions relied upon the number of eligible electors rather than population figures. The Commission decided to use the most accurate and up-to-date information: the numbers of electors from the 2000 Yukon general election.   Deviation Guideline The Elections Act does not refer to a particular percentage deviation.   The Yukon Electoral District Boundaries Commission Report, 1991 (the “1991 Yukon Report”) noted: ... I have decided that the range of plus or minus 25 percent should serve as a guide in framing my recommendations for the Yukon’s electoral boundaries. However, where necessary, I was prepared to consider a greater deviation in order to achieve effective representation.[xli]   Subsequent to the Dixon decision, a deviation of plus or minus 25 percent has been generally accepted in Canada, and has been referred to as “the Canadian standard.”[xlii] However, we agree with the 1998 British Columbia Electoral Boundaries District Commission that nothing in Dixon precludes an argument that a deviation greater than plus or minus 25 percent may be justified in appropriate circumstances.  After its review of the relevant cases, that Commission noted: … Canadian court decisions have established that there are limits to the degree to which a departure from representation by population is acceptable under the Constitution.  At the same time, the courts have endorsed such deviations from the electoral quota as are necessary in order to ensure that voters are effectively represented.[xliii]   The Saskatchewan Reference did not fix 25 percent as a constitutional threshold. Rather, the legislation considered by the Court specified 25 percent as the maximum deviation for the southern part of the province.  In that case, both the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that deviations greater than 25 percent for the two northern ridings were constitutionally acceptable for achieving effective representation, given the regional factors such as the scarcity of population and the difficulty of communication.  The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada adhered to the proposition asserted in Dixon that “… only those deviations should be admitted which can be justified on the ground that they contribute to better government of the populace as a whole, giving due weight to regional issues within the populace and geographic factors within the territory governed."[xliv]   This Commission has decided to apply the plus or minus 25 percent deviation as a guideline.   Special Circumstances Section 419(f) of the Elections Act requires the Commission to take into account “any special circumstances relating to the existing electoral districts.” “Special circumstances” are not defined in the Elections Act. The Saskatchewan Reference spoke about some of the factors which may justify departure from absolute voter parity in the pursuit of more effective representation. That decision made it clear that the list of factors that may need to be taken into account is not closed, however those identified were: §         geography §         community history §         community interests §         minority representation.   The Friends of Democracy case added to this list:[xlv] §         language differences §         difficulties in communication with remote communities §         travel expenses.   The 1991 Yukon Report under “Special circumstances of the Yukon” states: The entire region outside Whitehorse is sparsely populated and ... no other Canadian city dominates its province or territory to the extent that Whitehorse dominates the Yukon. The disproportionate representation of rural areas in the existing legislature was explicitly intended to offset this feature of population distribution. Given relatively less developed municipal organization of much of rural Yukon, MLAs from those areas contend with a broader range of responsibilities toward their constituents than is common elsewhere in Canada. Also, Yukoners are used to intensive representation and expect to be able to meet with their representatives, face-to-face, on a regular basis.[xlvi]   This Commission acknowledges that similar circumstances exist today.    Number of Electoral Districts Section 409 of the Elections Act explicitly mandates the Commission to review and make proposals as to the number of electoral districts. Section 9(2) of the Yukon Act[xlvii] provides for a minimum of 12 and a maximum of 20 members of the Legislative Assembly.   The Commission considered the potential consequences of having an odd or even number of seats in the Legislative Assembly. Odd and even numbers of electoral districts are found in other jurisdictions in Canada. The Yukon has experienced both circumstances at different periods in its history. We concluded that there are offsetting advantages and disadvantages to both, which result in the issue having no influence on our proposals.   Timing of the Next Review The Commission has kept in mind throughout its deliberations that section 411 of the Elections Act provides for another electoral boundaries review within six to eight years.   Principles and Other Factors In addition to following the mandatory considerations set out in section 419 of the Elections Act, the Commission was guided by the principles of effective representation and voter parity. The Commission also considered geographic boundaries, the role of the Legislative Assembly, and the electoral quotient.   Effective Representation In the Saskatchewan Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in section 3 of the Charter is the right to effective representation and not equality of voting power per se. Representation includes having a voice in the deliberations of government as well as the right to raise issues with elected representatives. Effective representation is “the primary goal” in exercising the right to vote.[xlviii]  Even relative voter parity may be undesirable, if it detracts from effective representation.  Factors such as regional issues, geography and those previously mentioned under “Special Circumstances”, may be taken into account to achieve this fundamental goal.   Voter Parity The Dixon decision examined the historical development of voting rights in Canada and recognized that absolute equality of voting power has never been required in Canada – that some degree of deviation is permissible. The case concluded that it is relative equality of voting power which underlies our system of representational democracy and is fundamental to the right to vote enshrined in section 3 of the Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada in the Saskatchewan Reference subsequently stated that the pursuit of relative parity of voting power, while important in our representative democracy, must meet the primary goal of effective representation. The Commission has sought relative voter parity.   Geographic Boundaries The Commission has attempted to simplify and rationalize electoral boundaries, wherever possible, on the basis of physical geography.  Section 419(b) of the Elections Act requires us to take into account the “physical characteristics” of the electoral districts.  Our intention is that the boundaries will be logical delineations of electoral districts.   Role of the Legislative Assembly The relative difficulty faced by some MLAs in serving their constituents, particularly in electoral districts which are vast and sparsely populated, received our full consideration. The Commission balanced the weight given this factor with the knowledge that the Legislative Assembly is able to assist members in meeting these responsibilities.   Electoral Quotient An electoral quotient is the average number of electors per electoral district. The plus or minus 25 percent guideline is measured against the quotient.  A common approach in Canada is to calculate the electoral quotient by dividing the total number of electors by the total number of electoral districts. This approach is not exclusive. The Saskatchewan Constituency Boundaries Act, 1993[xlix] employs a different method in calculating the electoral quotient. It removes the two northern ridings and their populations from its calculations. The electoral quotient for the remainder of the province is determined by using only the 56 remaining ridings and the population of those ridings. This approach is in keeping with the recognition in the Saskatchewan Reference that the two northern ridings are justified, as they are vast with a relatively small and dispersed population.   [i][i] (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 247 (B.C.S.C.) (McLachlin C.J.) [ii] ibid. at 266 [iii] ibid. at 265 [iv] ibid. at 267 [v] ibid. at 266 [vi] ibid. at 283 [vii] British Columbia Electoral Boundaries Commission Report, December 3, 1998, at page 17 [viii] Deviation can also be determined by comparing the population of an electoral district with the average population per electoral district, sometimes referred to as “the equal population norm”. [ix] The Commission used a slightly different approach to calculate the electoral quotient, which is detailed in Part IV, “Establishing the Electoral Quotient”. [x] [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (McLachlin J.) [xi] ibid. at 183 [xii] ibid. at 183-185 [xiii] ibid. at 186 [xiv] ibid. at 188 [xv] S.S. 1989-90, R-20.2 [xvi] S.S. 1986-87-88, c. E.6-1 [xvii] Saskatchewan Reference, supra, at 190 and 197 [xviii] ibid. at 189 [xix] (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 447 (Alta. C.A.) (“1991 Alberta Reference”) [xx] (1994), 119 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (Alta. C.A.) (“1994 Alberta Reference”) [xxi] 1991 Alberta Reference, supra. at 453 [xxii] ibid. at 454 [xxiii] ibid. at 452 [xxiv] 1994 Alberta Reference, supra, at 12 [xxv] (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 362 (P.E.I. S.C.) [xxvi] ibid. at 369-370 [xxvii] ibid. at 386 [xxviii] (1998), 168 D.L.R. (4th) 79 (P.E.I. C.A.) [xxix] ibid. at 98 [xxx] ibid. at 98 [xxxi] S.C.C. Bulletin, 1999, p. 1913 [xxxii] R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-5 [xxxiii] (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 551 (N.W.T. S.C.) [xxxiv] ibid. at 557 [xxxv] ibid. at 558 [xxxvi] ibid. at 560 [xxxvii] ibid. at 568 [xxxviii] ibid. at 564-565 [xxxix] [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at 254 [xl] (1999), 184 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 145 (NFTD) [xli] Yukon Electoral Boundaries Commission Report, 1991, at page 55 [xlii] The Nunavut Electoral Boundaries Commission Report, 1997, p. 17 [xliii] British Columbia Electoral Boundaries Commission Report, supra. at p. 21 [xliv] Saskatchewan Reference, supra. at 185 [xlv] Friends of Democracy, supra. at 560 [xlvi] 1991 Yukon Report, supra. at 42 [xlvii] R.S.C. 1985 c. Y-2 [xlviii] Saskatchewan Reference, supra. at 184 [xlix] The Constituency Boundaries Act, 1993, S.S. 1993, c. 27-1, as amended by S.S. 1997, c. 31

Appendix E TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MATRIX

Matrix Scoring To derive the scores used in the matrix, an average (mean) value was calculated for each variable.  From the average score, increments of +/-10%, +/-20% and +/-30% were found for each variable.  For the majority* of the variables, the following scores relate to the calculated means and increments:   Score Means/Increments +3 ³30% +2 ³20% +1 ³10% 0 >-10% to <10% -1 £-10% -2 £-20% -3 £-30%   *The Population Density variable used a reverse scoring methodology where –3 ³  30%…3 £ -30% (see “Matrix Variables” for details).   Using this scoring system, a higher score (+1, +2, +3) indicates a greater degree of difficulty in representation.  A lower score (-1, -2, -3) indicates a lesser degree of difficulty in representation.  An average score is deemed to be between –10% and 10% of the average and is given the value of 0.   On the matrices, the “Total” score reflects the overall difficulty in effective representation for each electoral division based on the six matrix variables.  The lowest possible score is –18 (least difficult to represent), and the highest possible score is 18 (most difficult to represent).  The following chart breaks down the score ranges into 5 categories of difficulty for effective representation based on equal increments from the average score category:     Degree of Difficulty Total Score Range Most difficult 13 to 18 More difficult 7 to 12 Average -6 to 6 Less difficult -7 to –12 Least difficult -13 to –18   Matrix Variables   As mentioned in the report, six variables were used as measures for the matrix. The following describes each of the variables with reference to methodology, data source and technical merit.    1.   Area       The geographic area of each electoral division was reported in square kilometres as determined by Alberta Finance, Statistics using MapInfo® geographic referencing software, based on the standard geography files for Alberta provided by Statistics Canada, Geography Division.         The larger the area, the greater the difficulty in representing constituents, resulting in a higher score. 2.  Population Density       Population density is the number of people per square kilometre.  Calculations are based on the geographic area figures for each electoral division, as well as population numbers from the 2001 Census of Canada. Population figures have been adjusted to include Aboriginal population counts from Indian and Northern Affairs Canada for those Indian Reserves missed in the 2001 Census.         When the population displays a higher level of concentration for a given land area, it will result in a lower score. A higher population density indicates a lesser degree of difficulty in representation.   3.  Rural/Urban Ratio       This ratio compares the population in each electoral division living in rural areas versus those in urban areas, represented as a ratio per 100 urban population. An urban centre is defined as an incorporated municipality having 1,000 people or more. Population data were derived from the 2001 Census of Canada for the calculations.         The more “ruralized” an electoral division, the greater the difficulty in representation (example: Athabasca-Wabasca has 759 rural constituents for every 100 urban constituents.  The resulting rural/urban (r/u) ratio value is 759 which is more than 30% above the mean and results in a score of +3).  Inversely, the more “urbanized” an electoral division, the less difficult it is to represent, thus is assigned a lower score (example: Calgary-Bow has 0 rural constituents for every 100 urban constituents.  The resulting r/u ratio value is 0 which is more than 30% below the mean and results in a score of -3).   4.   “Dependant” Population Proportion       This variable measures the proportion of the population who are “dependant”, or not in the labour force age group compared to the total population. “Dependants” include children (14 years of age and under) and seniors (65 years and older).  The age data used for this variable came from the 2001 Census of Canada.         The higher the number of “dependants” compared to the overall population, the higher the “Dependant Proportion”, which in turn is given a higher score and considered more difficult to represent.     5.   Elected/Appointed Bodies       The number of elected or appointed bodies includes: municipalities, health regions, school divisions (public and separate), Indian Reserves, and Metis Settlements.  Data were obtained from Alberta Finance, Statistics’ Geographic Information System.          The higher the number of elected/appointed bodies present, the greater the difficulty in effective representation, resulting in a higher score.   6.  Distance to Legislature       The geographic centre of each electoral division was found with the aid of MapInfo® geographic referencing software. From this point a measurement of the direct distance to the Legislature was found in kilometres.         The higher the distance in kilometres from the Legislature, the more difficult it is to effectively represent constituents, resulting in a higher score.   Matrix Scoring System   Below is a chart which outlines the scoring system for each Matrix.  Matrix 1 refers to existing electoral divisions, while Matrix 2 refers to the proposed electoral divisions.     EXISTING ELECTORAL DIVISIONS - MATRIX 1     Area Density (*Reverse) R/U Ratio “Dependant” Proportion Elected Bodies Distance     % 7954 904 53.4 31.47 12 198 Score   -30 5,568 633 37 22.03 8 139 -3   -20 6,363 723 43 25.18 10 158 -2   -10 7,159 814 48 28.32 11 178 -1   0 7,954 904 53 31.47 12 198 0   10 8,749 994 59 34.62 13 218 1   20 9,545 1085 64 37.76 14 238 2   30 10,340 1175 69 40.91 16 257 3   Mean 7,954 904 53 31.47 12 198                     *Reverse = scores are reversed (i.e. +3 to -3 instead of -3 to +3)   PROPOSED ELECTORAL DIVISIONS - MATRIX 2     Area Density (*Reverse) R/U Ratio “Dependant” Proportion Elected Bodies Distance     % 7954 869 47 31.34 11 199 Score   -30 5,568 608 33 21.94 8 139 -3   -20 6,363 695 38 25.07 9 159 -2   -10 7,159 782 42 28.21 10 179 -1   0 7,954 869